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Abstract
This paper examines the impact of gender-progressive reforms to the inher-
itance law in India on women’s outcomes. Despite stipulating that daughters
would have equal shares as sons in ancestral property, I find that the reform
failed to increase the actual likelihood of women inheriting property. Instead,
parents appear to be “gifting” their share of land to their sons in order to
circumvent the law. However, parents also appear to be compensating their
daughters for such disinheritance by giving them alternative transfers in the
form of either higher dowries or more education following the reform.
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Decisions linked to intergenerational transfers are of fundamental importance in
determining the distribution of income and productivity in society. The existence of
gender gaps in such transfers has been widely documented, especially in developing
countries [Agarwal, 1994, World Bank, 2012]. While this is often interpreted as re-
flecting gender biased preferences of parents (typically in favour of sons), a number
of studies have argued that this could arise even when parents are unbiased, e.g. if
there is need to mitigate an incentive problem between siblings [Botticini and Siow,
2003], or if rates of return to asset-specific experience di↵er by gender [Rosenzweig
and Wolpin, 1985] etc. This would imply that in the presence of multiple and substi-
tutable forms of transfer, under-investment in one dimension might be compensated
by over-investment in another. For example, if we consider land and education to be
two key forms of capital, then lower land transfers made by parents to girls compared
to boys could be o↵set by relatively higher investment in their education if parents
display inequality aversion. However, if there exists complementarity between assets
(e.g. if higher education improves farm productivity), then parents might choose
to concentrate all assets in one heir, typically the son, such that gender gap in one
form of transfer may be compounded by gaps in other forms as well.
The existing evidence in the context of developing countries is mixed in this re-
gard. While some studies, e.g. Quisumbing [1994], Estudillo et al. [2001], Quisumb-
ing and Otsuka [2001], La Ferrara and Milazzo [2012] find support for compensating
behaviour of parents, others like Quisumbing et al. [2004] find that sons are favoured
in transfer of both land and schooling. One feature of these existing studies is that,
with the exception of Quisumbing et al. [2004], most of them focus on matrilineal
societies, where kinship is traced along the female line. Patrilineal societies, where
kinship is traced along the male line, may be expected to behave di↵erently. Hence,
there is a need to study the relationship between alternative forms of intergener-
ational transfers in the context of patrilineal systems more typical of developing
countries, and the corresponding implications for gender equity.
This paper attempts to fill this gap. In particular, it seeks to analyze whether
greater property rights for women leads to higher or lower levels of alternative forms
of transfer, in particular, education and dowries. The principal methodological prob-
lem faced in causally exploring such a relationship is that of potential endogeneity.
Unobserved heterogeneity at the household level that is correlated with both female
property rights and related female outcomes may generate spurious results. For ex-
ample, gender progressive parents may be more likely to invest in their daughters’
education as well as give them greater rights to family inheritance. This could lead
to the classic omitted variable problem that would bias the estimates of the impact
of female property rights. A second complication in this regard may arise due to
measurement error as it is often di cult to obtain appropriate measures of female
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property rights due to the fact that women in many societies lack formal titles to
property [Deere and Leon, 2003, Sweetman, 2008]. This may introduce further bi-
ases in the estimates of the causal impact of women’s property rights on relevant
outcomes.
To address these problems, this paper exploits legislative changes to the central
inheritance law in India as a source of exogenous variation in female inheritance
rights.1 Like most personal laws in India, inheritance laws too vary by religion. The
fundamental law governing present day inheritance rights of four religious commu-
nities i.e. Hindus, Buddhists, Jains and Sikhs2, called the Hindu Succession Act
1956 (henceforth refered to as HSA 1956), was designed to lay down a law of suc-
cession whereby sons and daughters would enjoy equal inheritance rights to family
property. In reality, however, significant gender inequalities existed in the law that
disadvantaged daughters considerably. The main source of bias came from ancestral
or joint family property, to which sons enjoyed a direct right by birth to a share but
daughters did not. Both had equal rights of inheritance to the separate property
that their father accumulated during his lifetime. But, due to the fact that a consid-
erable amount of property, especially land in rural areas, is still jointly owned, such
biased rights had a crippling e↵ect on the property ownership of women in India.3
The earliest attempts at amending this law were made by five Indian states,
namely Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, Kerala, Karnataka and Maharashtra, between
late 1970s and early 1990s. The amendments stated that women who were unmarried
at the time the reform was passed in their state would be granted claims equal
to that of their brothers in ancestral or joint family property, including the right
to a share by survivorship [Agarwal, 1994].4 I exploit these state-level legislative
amendments to the HSA 1956 as a “natural” experiment in order to study the
impact of a potential improvement in women’s inheritance rights on their likelihood
of inheritance, education and dowry in India.
The identification strategy in this paper firstly uses the fact that exposure to
the improved inheritance rights regime following the amendments was determined
by the woman’s state of birth and year of birth. Not only did a woman have to
1Here, inheritance refers to post-mortem inheritance that is typically obtained after the death
of the patriarch of the family.
2These religions are considered to be o↵shoots of Hinduism and hence are looked upon as being
“Hindu-like” religions. For the rest of the paper, I will use the term “Hindu” to denote Hindus,
Buddhists, Sikhs and Jain, i.e. religions to which the HSA 1956 applied.
3In my dataset, ancestral land constitutes approx. 84% of total household land in India. To
clarify, the HSA 1956 applies to all ancestral property, including both land and non-land assests,
but since land accounts for a large proportion of property in India, especially in villages, I focus
on land in this paper.
4Details regarding each state amendment is available in “The Hindu Succession Act 1956, with
State Amendments (Bare Act)”.
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be born in a state that passed the reform, she also had to be young enough to be
unmarried at the time of reform in order to benefit from it. Since more than 85%
of women in the dataset I use are married by the age of 21 but only about 2%
women get married before 10,5 one would expect that women who belonged to the
latter group would benefit the most from it, while those who belonged to the former
would benefit the least. Secondly, property in the woman’s parental family should
not have been partitioned already by the time of the reform. As stated in Agarwal
[1994], the HSA 1956 stipulates that, “a person’s share in ancestral property was
deemed to be that which the person would get if the property were partitioned ...
on a per capita basis among all family members holding an interest in the [ancestral]
property.” This implies that when the ancestral property is partitioned (typically
at the death of the patriarch of the family i.e. say the grandfather), all members
of the coparcenary (which includes the grandfather’s children as well as the eligible
grandchildren) would inherit (or at least delineate) their individual shares at that
same point in time. Thus, exposure to the inheritance reform is also defined by the
timing of the woman’s paternal grandfather’s death. Only if her grandfather died
after the reform was passed would she be eligible to benefit from the reform, since
only in such families would bequests be determined according to the new rules.
Therefore, I identify the causal impact of the inheritance reform by using a triple
di↵erences methodology that exploits variation in women’s state of birth, year of
birth and timing of grandfather’s death. Whether or not the woman’s grandfather
died after the reform constitutes the key treatment in this context. Of those whose
grandfather died after the reform, the ‘most treated’ group consists of women who
were 10 years or younger at the time the reform was passed in their state; women
who were 11-15 years old at the time comprise a ‘partially treated’ group, since
approximately 16% women in my dataset get married within this age band; women
who were 16-20 years old at the time are ‘least treated’, since close to 60% of women
in this age-group would already have been married by then. Women who were 21
years or older constitute the omitted group. The identifying assumption is that, in
the absence of the reform, any di↵erence between women in households where the
grandfather died before reform and those where he died after reform would have
been the same on average across all age-groups.
I use individual level data obtained from the Rural Economic and Demographic
Survey (REDS) 1999, which is a representative survey of households in 16 major
states of India that contain 90% of the country’s population (Census of India, 2011).
The REDS 99 dataset contains retrospective information on all members of the
household provided by household head, including on daughters who have married
5The median age at marriage in my dataset is approximately 18 years.
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and left the household.
I find that the inheritance reform had virtually no impact on the actual likelihood
of inheritance for the treated women. This is consistent with existing evidence
from ethnographic and mixed qualitative-quantitative studies in the reforming states
described in Bates [2004], Brown et al. [2002] and Brule [2012], which document that
the progressive legislative amendments to the HSA 1956 failed to have any impact
on women’s inheritance in these states in practice.
Instead, I find that the likelihood of a land “gift” being made to a brother of
a treated woman increased significantly relative to control group following the re-
form. I interpret this as indicating that parents6 were attempting to circumvent
the law by “gifting” their share of the coparcenary (joint family) property to their
son in order to avoid having to give property to the daughter.7 This was made
possible by the intestate nature of the HSA 1956 whereby the rules of the law ap-
plied only in the absence of a will. This suggests that the reason why no e↵ect of
the reform was observed on land inheritance of daughters is because parents were
behaving strategically to avoid having to comply by the rules of the amendment
and give their daughters their rightful share. Indeed, the Law Commission of India,
in a report prepared later in relation to the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act
2005, explicitly documents the occurrence of such strategic behaviour on the part
of some families in Tamil Nadu during the time of the Tamil Nadu Amendment
of the HSA, including even fraudulent pre-dated partition of joint family property,
to defeat the rights of the daughter. Moreover, the legal literature critiquing these
state-level amendments at the time of their enactment openly doubted their “real”
e cacy since they failed to “protect the share of the daughter from being defeated
by ... testamentary disposition [of joint family property] in favour of another, or by
alienation” [Sivaramayya, 1997].
I also examine the impact of the reform on alternative forms of transfers to
women, in order to assess whether parents were following reinforcing or compen-
sating strategies as a response to the reform. Traditionally, dowry payments have
constituted the most common form of such transfers - a pre-mortem bequest to
daughters in South Asia [Anderson, 2004, Goody, 1973]. I find heterogeneous treat-
ment e↵ects on dowries of treated women by age group. The ‘most treated’ group of
women received lower mean dowries on average relative to control group, while the
6I use the terms “parent” and “father” interchangeably, since mothers typically have little voice
regarding family property matters in the patrilineal system, especially in rural India.
7Apart from the free-riding and di↵erential returns theories, another oft-cited reason for dis-
favouring daughters’ inheritance of household property in India is to prevent the fragmentation or
loss of control over jointly owned family land. Due to customs of virilocality and village exogamy,
whereby married daughters leave their parents’ home to live with their husband’s family which is
generally outside their own village of residence, parents run the risk of losing control over their
household property if their daughters inherit a share.
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‘partially treated’ group received higher dowries. The ‘least treated’ group of women
did not experience any significant change. I also examine the impact of the reform
on an alternative form of transfer i.e. education. Here, I find that women in the
‘most treated’ group had on average 1.4-1.7 additional years of education relative to
control group. Note that this is also the group of women who were of school-going
age at the time of the reform. On the other hand, no significant e↵ect is observed
on the education of the older age groups, especially those belonging to the ‘least
treated’ group who were past school-going age, suggesting that the findings are less
likley to be driven by correlated unobservables.
Taken together, these findings on inheritance, dowry and education suggest that
parents appear to be compensating their daughters for disinheriting them from
household property by transferring to them alternative forms of wealth like dowry
or education. For daughters who were past primary school-going age by the time the
reform was passed in their state, but approaching marriageable age, compensation
took the traditional form of dowries at the time of marriage. On the other hand,
for daughters that were still of school going-age at the time when the reform was
passed, compensation for disinheritance took the form of increased investment in
their education, while dowry payments for them were lower.
Therefore, the findings of this paper suggest that although progressive legislation
aimed at improving inheritance rights of women in India did not have the desired
first order e↵ect, intrahousehold dynamics may have ensured that parents were com-
pensating their daughters for such disinheritance in a manner that resulted in an
unintended but positive impact on alternative forms of transfers to daughters.8
This paper relates to two di↵erent strands of literature. First, it speaks to the lit-
erature on intergenerational transfers and bequest behaviour. Behrman et al. [1982]
find that in the presence of inequality aversion, parents may undertake compensating
strategies whereby they devote greater resources to children with lower endowments.
Empirical support for such compensating behaviour is also provided by Quisumbing
[1994], Estudillo et al. [2001], Quisumbing and Otsuka [2001], La Ferrara and Mi-
lazzo [2012] in the context of land and education, especially in matrilineal societies.
This paper shows that compensating strategies can be adopted by parents even
when legislation stipulates equal division of property, with implications for gender
equity. The existing literature has also studied dowry as a form of “pre-mortem”
transfer of wealth [Anderson, 2003, Goody, 1973], and a change in the environment
for producing bridal wealth, in the form of labour market expansion, has been put
8It is possible to interpret such a finding as being supportive of the assumption of parental
inequality aversion or preference for “equal outcomes” for their children used in general preference
models of resource allocation [Behrman et al., 1982]. However, without a credible way of estimating
present discounted value of these transfers, it is di cult to empirically verify such a claim.
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forth as potential mechanism for the reduction in prevalence of dowry [Botticini and
Siow, 2003]. My paper fits well with such a line of argument as it shows that a
legal reform in inheritance rights can have similar consequences on dowry payments
through its impact on education.9
This paper also relates to the literature on the role of land rights in enhanc-
ing investment incentives in agricultural land [Banerjee et al., 2002, Besley, 1995],
residential investment [Field, 2007], entreprenurial investment of retained earnings
[Johnson et al., 2003] etc. By analyzing how change in rules for intergenerational
tranfer of land a↵ects investment in children’s human capital, this paper shows that
consequences for the provision of land rights extends beyond the realms that are
traditionally studied.
A related paper, Goyal et al. [2013], also examines the impact of amendments
to the HSA 1956 on women’s inheritance in India. My study di↵ers from Goyal
et al. [2013] in a number of ways. Firstly, the results of my paper di↵er from Goyal
et al. [2013]. Unlike Goyal et al. [2013], I find no significant impact of the reform on
women’s propensity to inherit. I argue that the main reason for this di↵erence is that
Goyal et al. [2013] use variation in the timing of death of the woman’s father (i.e.
whether father died before or after the reform) to define treatment status. However,
as Agarwal [1994] points out, the amendment to the original HSA 1956 relates
to ancestral property owned by the grandfather such that the relevant trigger of
inheritance would be the timing of the death of the grandfather, and not the father.
Using variation in the timing of grandfather’s death, I find no significant impact on
the likelihood of inheritance for women post reform. Indeed, this is consistent with
the existing evidence from a number of the ethnographic and mixed qualitative-
quantitative studies on this topic [Bates, 2004, Brown et al., 2002, Brule, 2012] that
also document the widespread ine↵ectiveness of the reform with regard to women’s
inheritance.
In addition, when controls for father’s year of death are added, the positive
impact of the Goyal et al. [2013] on female inheritance disappears. Therefore, I
argue that their finding does not constitute the e↵ect of the reform per se but
rather could be driven by unobserved characteristics of fathers who live longer. For
example, although historically land markets in India have been thin, there has been
increased activity in the recent past, especially in the south [Deininger et al., 2007,
Deininger and Goyal, 2012]. Hence the positive coe cient reported by Goyal et al.
[2013] could merely be proxying for the fact that fathers who lived longer were more
likely to acquire land in the rapidly changing economic climate of the country, and
9Edlund [2006] distinguishes between “gross” dowry (assets the bride brings at the time of
marriage) and “net” dowry (those netted against groom payments); for the purpose of my paper,
I use dowry as gross dowry.
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leave a share to their daughters. But this would have nothing to do with the reform,
since daughters had rights to their father’s self-acquired property even before the
reform.
Finally, combined with my results on land gifts, education and dowry payments,
the estimated lack of impact on female inheritance that I find in my paper con-
tributes to our understanding of the process of intergenerational transfers in rural
India, where sons continue to be given exclusive inheritance rights to property (de-
spite enactment of progressive legislation favouring daughters) while daughters are
compensated for their disinheritance with either higher dowries or higher educa-
tion. Goyal et al. [2013] provide speculative explanations in this regard, hence the
evidence provided in this context to disentangle the underlying mechanism of the
reform’s impact constitutes a key innovation of my paper.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 1 describes the
institutional background of Hindu inheritance law in India, while Section 2 outlines
the data and identification strategy. Section 3 presents results on inheritance, and
Section 4 discusses the impact on alternative forms of transfers i.e. dowry payments
and education. Section 5 concludes.
1 The Institutional Background
1.1 The Hindu Personal (Inheritance) Law
As mentioned earlier, the laws for inheritance of property in India di↵er by religion.
The inheritance rights of Hindus are governed by the HSA 1956, which also governs
the rights of Buddhists, Jains and Sikhs. The Act was built on the foundation of
ancient legal doctrines that have prevailed in India since the 12 century A.D., and
purported to lay down a law of succession that gave equal rights of inheritance to
sons and daughters10. In reality, however, significant gender inequalities remained.
A key feature of the legal structure of Hindu inheritance in India is the distinction
between “joint family property” and “separate property”.11 Generally speaking,
joint family property “consists principally of ancestral property (that is, property
inherited from the father, paternal grandfather or paternal great-grandfather), plus
any property that was jointly acquired or was acquired separately but merged into
10These ancient Indian doctrines were completely biased in favour of sons as far as property
inheritance issues were concerned, while daughters had no inheritance rights at all in any kind of
property (Agarwal, 1994 pp. 206). The HSA 1956 was the first attempt to introduce some measure
of gender equality in this regard.
11The joint family here is a legal concept and need not coincide with the joint residence or or
any other aspect of a common household economy that may be implied in a sociological use of the
term [Agarwal, 1994].
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the joint property”. Separate property, on the other hand, “includes that which
was self-acquired (if acquired without detriment to the ancestral estate) and any
property inherited from persons other than father, paternal grandfather or paternal
great-grandfather” [Agarwal, 1994, p. 85-86].12
According to the HSA 1956, daughters of a Hindu male dying intestate (i.e.
without leaving a will)13 were equal inheritors, along with sons, of only their fa-
ther’s separate property and his “notional” portion of joint family property, but
had no direct inheritance rights to joint family property itself.14,15 Sons, on the
other hand, not only inherited their share of the father’s own property and his “no-
tional” portion of joint family property, but also had a direct right by birth to a
share of the joint family property. In fact, all persons who acquired interest in the
joint family property by birth were said to belong to the Hindu coparcenary”, which
is conceptually similar to an exclusive male membership club in relation to the issue
of inheritance to which women had no access.16
Hence, it is apparent that the daughters su↵ered from discrimination in terms
of inheritance under HSA 1956.
Moreover, for the millions living in rural India, the most common form of prop-
erty is land that is typically family-owned, which makes the gender bias in in-
heritance rights quite a significant phenomenon. Thus the law, by excluding the
daughter from participating in the coparcenary ownership of ancestral property, not
only discriminated against her on grounds of gender, but also led to a negation of
her fundamental right of equality as guaranteed to her by the Indian Constitution
[Ramanujam, 2005].
12Using the REDS 1999 dataset, it is estimated that ancestral property constitutes approx. 84%
of total household property in India. This indicates that the salience of the inheritance rights
reform was indeed quite high in India.
13According to Goyal et al. [2013], the proportion of people who die without making a
will in India is very high (around 65%, and probably even higher in rural areas). Recent
newpaper articles have put the number at a much higher 80% (see http://timesofindia.
indiatimes.com/Avoid-disputes-write-a-Will/articleshow/802650.cms and http://www.
fpgindia.org/2011/07/writing-a-will-know-some-facts.html). The main reason cited for
such low prevalence of wills in India is that people often find it uncomfortable discussing a will
in their lifetime because of the air of fatality and gloom that surrounds it. Thus, all this would
suggest that the HSA 1956 is what ultimately determines inheritance patterns within the family.
14The “notional” portion of the father’s share in the joint family property would be ascertained
under the assumption of a “notional” or hypothetical partition of that property, as if the partition
had taken place just before his death.
15In case of a Hindu woman dying intestate, all her property devolves equally upon her sons
and daughters and husband, if alive. If she has no children or other heirs with first right to her
property, then the property devolution takes place according to the source of acquisition.
16In addition to inheritance, sons could also demand partition of the joint family property while
daughters could not. E.g. if the joint family property was a dwelling house, sons (as part of
the coparcenary) could demand a partition of the same but daughters were only allowed right of
residence but no right of ownership or possession. For more details on the rules of inheritance
under the HSA 1956, please see the working paper [Roy, 2011].
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1.2 State Amendments to the HSA 1956
The topic of inheritance in India is a “concurrent” one, i.e. one over which both
the central and the state governments have legislative authority. Thus, although
the HSA 1956 is a central law, some of the states have subsequently amended the
HSA 1956. In particular, Kerala amended in 1976, Andhra Pradesh in 1986, Tamil
Nadu in 1989, Maharashtra and Karnataka in 1994 (see Figure 1), following which
daughters were granted direct inheritance rights and the right to a share by sur-
vivorship in joint family property, equal with their brothers, but only if they were
unmarried at the time of the reform.17 Such a reform opened up the entry of women
into what had till now been an exclusively male preserve and sought to, at least
partially, redress the concern of gender bias inherent in the original central law. I
exploit these legislative amendments as a “natural experiment” to study the impact
of a potential improvement in female inheritance rights on female outcomes in India.
2 Data and Identification Strategy
2.1 Data
I use the 1999 wave of the Rural Economic and Demographic Survey (REDS), which
is a representative survey of rural households in the 17 major states of India.18,19 The
REDS 99 contains detailed retrospective information on individual characteristics
of all members of the household, including daughters who have married and left the
household, provided by the household head. I focus on women who are daughters
of the head of the household and at least 22 years of age at the time of survey (this
ensures that women in the sample have completed their education). In addition,
I restrict the sample to Hindu, Buddhist, Sikh and Jain women (i.e. those who
were governed by the original HSA 1956 and thereby were a↵ected by the reform),
since almost 92 percent of the women in this dataset belong to these religions. I
also restrict the sample to only landed households, since land is the most commonly
held form of joint family/ancestral property in India. Finally, some of the mothers
of these women may themselves have been young enough to have been exposed to
17Kerala passed a slightly di↵erent amendment in the form of the Kerala Joint Hindu Family
System (Abolition) Act that recognized all family members with an interest in the undivided
family estate as being independent full owners of their shares from then onwards, i.e. abolished
joint family property altogether. But since the spirit of this amendment was similar to those passed
by the other reforming states, and could be expected to favourably a↵ect the inheritance of the
daughter, I club them together. However, the key findings of this paper are robust to the exclusion
of Kerala, as shown in Appendix Table A1 below.
18REDS 99 can be obtained from http://adfdell.pstc.brown.edu/arisreds_data/
19HSA 1956 did not apply to Jammu and Kashmir [Agarwal, 1994], and is hence dropped, leaving
me with 16 major states.
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the reform. To avoid any confounding impact on outcomes of daughters through
their mothers, I restrict the sample to only those mothers who were unexposed to
the reform i.e. were 44 years or older at the time of survey.20 Hence my sample
comprises of daughters who were at least 22 years old at survey and whose mothers
were at least 44 years old at survey in landed, Hindu households. This leaves me
with a sample size of 4,207 women.
Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 1. Mean age for this sample of
women is 32.74 years, while average level of education is 4.43 years (6 years of
education corresponds to completion of primary schooling). More than half live in
low caste households.
Table 2 carries out the pre-reform balance test, both between reforming and
non-reforming states in Panel A as well as within reforming states, between families
where grandfather died before reform (treated group) and families where grandfather
died after reform (control group). This is to examine whether there exists any pre-
existing di↵erential in observables between these groups. In Panel A, I use women
who were born on or before 1955, i.e. who were 21 years or older in 1976 when
the first state to reform, Kerala, passed its amendment. There is no evidence of
any systematic di↵erences between the reforming and non-reforming states prior
to the reform. In Panel B, the sample is restricted to only reforming states and
to daughters who were 21 years or older at the time of reform in their respective
states. Evidently, the only di↵erences between the treated and control group is in
terms of parental age, since families where the grandfather dies later are likely to be
younger than those where he dies earlier. Parental age, along with other household
characteristics, are controlled for in the regression analysis.
2.2 Identification Strategy
The identification strategy in this paper uses the fact that exposure to the inheri-
tance reform is determined by a woman’s state of birth, year of birth and timing of
her paternal grandfather’s death. In order to benefit from the reform, a woman not
only had to be born in a reforming state21 and be young enough to be unmarried
when the reform is passed, but also have a living grandfather at the time. This
is because household property in the woman’s parental family should not already
20The cut-o↵ for mothers is calculated as follows: to be unexposed to the reform, a mother had
to be married by the time it was passed. Since most women in my dataset are married by the time
they are 21, this implies that she has to be 21 or older in 1976 (when the first reform was passed
by Kerala. Thus, at the time of survey in 1999, she would be 44 years or older.
21Although REDS 99 contains data on state of current residence of the parental household of
the daughter, approximately 97% of the heads of these households (typically, the father) report
having lived in this same village since birth. This mitigates any concerns regarding endogeneous
migration.
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have been partitioned by the time of the reform. As stated in Agarwal [1994], the
HSA 1956 stipulates that, “a person’s share in ancestral property was deemed to
be that which the person would get if the property were partitioned ... on a per
capita basis among all family members holding an interest in the [ancestral] prop-
erty.” This implies that when the ancestral property is partitioned (typically at the
death of the patriarch of the family i.e. say the grandfather), all members of the
coparcenary (which includes the grandfather’s children as well as the eligible grand-
children) would inherit (or at least delineate) their individual shares at that same
point in time. Thus, exposure to the inheritance reform is defined by the timing of
the grandfather’s death in a key way.22 Only if her grandfather died after the reform
was passed would she stand to benefit from the reform, since only in such families
would bequests be determined according to the new rules.
Therefore, I identify the causal impact of the inheritance reform by using a triple
di↵erences methodology that exploits variation in women’s state of birth, year of
birth and timing of grandfather’s death. Whether or not the woman’s grandfather
died after the reform constitutes the key treatment in this context. Of those whose
grandfather died after the reform, the ‘most treated’ group consists of women who
were 10 years or younger at the time the reform was passed in their state; women
who were 11-15 years old at the time the reform was passed in their state comprise a
‘partially treated’ group, since approximately 16% women in my dataset get married
within this age band; women who were 16-20 years old at the time the reform was
passed in their state are ‘least treated’, since close to 60% of women in this age-
group would already have been married by then. Women who were 21 years or older
constitute the omitted category. The identifying assumption is that, in the absence
22I argue that this is also the main reason why my findings on women’s inheritance di↵er from
that of Goyal et al. [2013], who use timing of father’s death to define treatment status and report
a positive impact. I replicate my results using their data REDS 2006 and their results using my
data REDS 1999, and find that my results hold for 2006 as do theirs for 1999 (see Appendix Table
A2). However, I argue that their finding does not constitute the e↵ect of the reform per se but
rather could be driven by unobserved characteristics of fathers who live longer because when I
add father’s year of death fixed e↵ects to their estimation, their positive coe cient disappears (see
Appendix Table A2 column 6). Now, it has been shown that although historically land markets
in India have been thin, there has been increased activity in the recent past, especially in the
south [Deininger et al., 2007, Deininger and Goyal, 2012]. Hence the positive impact that Goyal
et al. [2013] find could merely be proxying for the fact that fathers who lived longer were more
likely to acquire land in the rapidly changing economic climate of the country, and leave a share to
their daughters. But this would have nothing to do with the reform, since daughters had rights to
father’s self-acquired property even before the reform. I do find that the coe cient on Treatment
is positive and significant for REDS 2006 (columns 3 and 4 in Appendix Table A2), indicating that
for women who were 20 or older at the time of reform, the death of their grandfather did induce
an increase in land inherited. This is not the case for REDS 99. However, what is important to
note is that there is no evidence of a di↵erential impact for the treated groups of women who were
unmarried at the reform and hence eligible to benefit from the reform, which is consistent across
results from both REDS 99 and REDS 2006.
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of the reform, any di↵erence between women in households where the grandfather
died before reform and those where he died after reform would have been the same
across all age-groups.
Inclusion of the ‘least treated’ group serves as a form of test for an implication
of the identifying assumption, whereby one can compare outcomes of women in
this group with those in the omitted category. Since so many of the women in the
‘least treated’ group would have already been married by the time of the reform
and hence ineligible to benefit from it, the di↵erence between the outcomes of this
group relative to the omitted category should not, therefore, vary systematically by
treatment status in any significant way.
Within a regression framework, I therefore estimate the following equation:
yisk = ↵s +  k +  sk +  1Dis,(k k0 10) +  2Dis,(k0 15kk0 11) +  3Dis,(k0 20kk0 16)
+ 01Dis,(k k0 5) ⇤GFi +  02Dis,(k0 15kk0 11) ⇤GFi +  03D0is,(k0 20kk0 16) ⇤GFi
+µGFi +Xisk⌘ + ✏isk (1)
The dependent variable yisk denotes the relevant outcome of woman i in state s
born in year k. Let the reform be passed in year k0 in state s. Then Dis,(k k0 10) is a
binary variable indicating whether woman i belonging to cohort k was 10 years old
or younger when the reform was passed in her state. Similarly, Dis,(k0 15kk0 11)
is a binary variable indicating whether she was between 11 and 15 years old and
Dis,(k0 20kk0 16) indicating whether she was between 16 and 20 years old respec-
tively. As mentioned earlier, the group consisting of women who were 21 years or
older at the time of the reform constitute the omitted category. GFi is a binary vari-
able that equals 1 if the grandfather died after the reform and zero otherwise. ↵s
represents state fixed e↵ects which accounts for state-specific characteristics that do
not vary across cohorts,  k represents year of birth fixed e↵ects which accounts for
the fact that individuals born in di↵erent years may be exposed to di↵erent macro
shocks, while  sk captures state-specific linear trends by year of birth.23 Xisk is a
vector of household level control variables, including parental age, parental educa-
tion, number of children in family, household income, caste status, etc. ✏isk is the
error term. To address serial correlation concerns and to allow for heteroscedasticity,
the standard errors are clustered at the state level.
The coe cients of interest are  01 and  
0
2, which capture the di↵erential impact of
the reform on women belonging to the ‘most treated’ and ‘partially treated’ groups,
respectively, relative to control group. As discussed above, the ‘least treated’ group
23I also present regression results using a more rigorous specification that includes state-year of
birth fixed e↵ects instead of state linear trends, but in that case, the level e↵ects of the reform, i.e.
the  is, can no longer be identified.
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is included as a falsification test, and hence  03 is expected to be close to zero.
3 Impact on Inheritance
3.1 Inheritance of Daughters
In this section, I analyse the impact of the inheritance reform on the likelihood
of women actually inheriting property. The results are presented in Table 3. The
dependent variable is a binary variable that takes the value 1 if the daughter inherits
any land and zero otherwise.
Column 1 indicates that there is no di↵erential impact of the reform on the
likelihood of inheriting land for any of the ‘treated’ groups relative to control group.
I cannot reject the equality of the coe cient for the ‘most treated’ group ( 01) with
those for the ‘partially treated’ ( 02) or the ‘least treated’ ( 
0
3). This implies that
the likelihood of inheritance for daughters did not increase even after the reform
was passed, and that they continued to be disinherited from what was their rightful
share in ancestral property. This is consistent with existing evidence obtained from
ethnographic and mixed qualitative-quantitative studies conducted in the various
reforming states, which find that the amendment to HSA 1956 had no impact on
the likelihood of inheritance by daughters [Bates, 2004, Brown et al., 2002, Brule,
2012]. This result is robust to the inclusion of household controls (Column 2) as
well as state-specific linear trends (Column 3). However, with state-specific linear
trends, identification of the level e↵ects of the reform (i.e. the  is) may be somewhat
problematic since both vary over state and year such that the estimates of the  is
may not be perfectly reliable. I also present results with state-year of birth fixed
e↵ects to test for the robustness of the coe cients for the treated groups i.e.  0is
(Column 4). With the inclusion of state-year of birth fixed e↵ects, the level e↵ects
of the reform can no longer be identified, but the findings for the triple-di↵erence
coe cients remain robust.
One possible way to ensure that daughters did not get any inheritance would
be for the father to write a will to this e↵ect, since the rules of the HSA 1956 only
applies in the absence of a will (intestate succession). Although my dataset does
not contain information on wills, I do have information on transfer(s) of land made
by the father to his son(s) in the form of a “gift”, along with the year in which
such a transfer was made. Using this, I create a binary variable “land gift to son”,
which captures whether or not such a “land gift” was made by the father to any
of his sons after the death of the grandfather, for each woman in my sample. As
mentioned above, the death of the grandfather is the likely trigger for partition of
joint family property. If the grandfather died before the reform, the partition would
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have taken place along the lines of the original HSA 1956 rules, where only the men
of the family had the direct right to inherit joint family property. If, on the other
hand, the grandfather died after the reform, the partition would take place along the
lines of the amended rules whereby even the women, in this case daughters, could
inherit a share of joint family property. Hence, if fathers did not want to give their
daughters their rightful share in joint family property, they would be more likely to
will or “gift” away their entire share of joint family property to their sons in the
latter case, so as to bypass the law.24
3.2 Land Gift to Sons
The results for land gift to sons are presented in Table 4. For all specifications, I
find that in families where the grandfather died after the reform, the likelihood of
a “land gift” being made to a brother of a treated woman increased significantly,
relative to control, for all the age groups. For instance, in the specification including
state linear trends (Column 3), the impact on brothers of the ‘most treated’ group
is a relative increase of 13 percentage points while that on the brothers of the ‘least
treated’ groups is 7 percentage points, statistically significant at 5 percent level or
more; and while that for the brothers of the ‘partially treated’ group is insignificant,
its magnitude is quite similar to that of the ‘least treated’ group (the F -tests fail to
reject the equality of these two coe cient, with the p-value being 0.93). I interpret
this as indicating that in these families, fathers were strategically circumventing the
law by “gifting” their share of the coparcenary (joint family) property to their son(s)
in order to avoid having to give property to their daughter. The overall e↵ect for
these treated groups is not significantly di↵erent from zero, given the negative and
significant level e↵ect of the treatment variable µ. However, once state-year of birth
fixed e↵ects are controlled for (Column 4), µ becomes insignificant, while the other
coe cients remain qualititatively similar.
Hence, the evidence on “land gifts” to sons suggests that the reason why no first
order e↵ect of the reform is observed on land inheritance of daughters is because
fathers were behaving strategically to avoid having to comply by the rules of the
amendment and give inheritance to their daughters. Indeed the Law Commission of
India, in a report prepared in relation to the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act,
explicitly notes the occurrence of such strategic behaviour on the part of some fami-
lies in Tamil Nadu following the Tamil Nadu Amendment, including even fraudulent
pre-dated partition of joint family property, to defeat the rights of the daughter [Law
24Theoretically speaking, the father could will or “gift” his share of joint family property to
anybody he wishes, but it is natural to expect he would give it to his son so as to retain the
property within his own nuclear family.
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Commission of India, 2000].
A potential reason for disfavouring property inheritance by daughters may be re-
lated to the existence of incentives for parents to prevent fragmentation of household
property, especially land.25 In India, daughters typically leave the household of their
parents after marriage and live with their husband’s family, known as virilocality.
This creates two problems: firstly, parents may fear loss of control over their house-
hold land to the daughter’s husband’s family if the daughter is allowed to inherit
a share. This maybe further reinforced by the notion of women being “guests” in
their natal (parental) home till they are married and that they really only belong to
their husband’s family [Kramarae and Spender, 2000]. Secondly, Botticini and Siow
[2003] discuss how giving daughters equal share in household property would create
disincentives for sons (who have a comparative advantage in working with family
assets compared to their married sisters) regarding provision of optimal e↵ort in
extending family wealth, as they would no longer be able to enjoy the full benefits
of their e↵ort. Hence, household land is typically passed along the male line alone
so as to keep it within the family, while daughters are paid dowries at the time of
their marriage, which constitutes their share of household property in the form of
a “pre-mortem” bequest. Indeed, Botticini and Siow [2003] discuss how parents’
decision to give dowries to their daughters and bequests (of e.g. assets like land)
to their sons constitute an optimal incentive scheme when married daughters leave
the parental household after marriage while sons stay back and enjoy a comparative
advantage in working with family assets.
Hence it may be argued that prior to the inheritance reform, parents were com-
pensating daughters for disinheriting them from household property by paying them
dowries at the time of their marriage. But what happened after the reform? Given
that I find that daughters continued to be disinherited from their rightful share of
household property after the reform, did compensation still take the form of dowries
or were parents using other forms of transfer? To answer these question, I now turn
to the analysis of alternative transfers in the form of dowry payments and education.
4 Alternative Forms of Transfer
4.1 Dowry Payments
REDS 99 contains information on nominal dowry payments made by parents at
the time of the daughter’s marriage. The nominal dowry payments in the dataset
25In fact, fragmentation was one of the key arguments presented against extending equal rights
of inheritance to joint family property for women in India in the original HSA 1956 [Agarwal,
1994].
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are converted to real values using the Indian Consumer Price Index (base: 1966 =
100).26
Table 5 presents the results relating to the impact of the inheritance reform on
log of real dowry payments at the time of marriage. Across various specifications, I
find that relative to control group, mean dowry payment at marriage increased for
women belonging to the ‘partially treated’ group while it declined for those belonging
to the ‘most treated’ group. For instance, in the specification including state linear
trends (Column 3), mean dowry payment increased by 50 percent for the ‘partially
treated’ but fell by 28 percent for the ‘most treated’. Impact on the ‘least treated’
group of women is also negative but marginally significant at 10 percent. Moreover,
once state-year of birth fixed e↵ects are controlled for (Column 4), the coe cient
for the ‘least treated’ group becomes much smaller in magnitude and statistically
insignificant, while that for ‘most treated’ group becomes even larger and that for
‘partially treated’ remains unchanged.
This indicates that following the reform, parents were compensating daughters
who were close to marriageable age (i.e. 11-15 years old at reform) using the tradi-
tional form of dowries. They o↵ered no compensation to daughters who are already
married (16 years or older at reform) since they are not eligible to benefit from the
reform. But why did dowries decline for younger daughters (i.e. 10 years or younger
at reform)? Were these daughters getting more of an alternative form of transfer,
and hence less dowries? To explore this further, let us turn to the analysis of the
impact of the inheritance reform on educational attainment of these women.
4.2 Education
The results for education are presented in Table 6. The dependant variable is the
number of years of education attained by the woman. Across various specifications,
we find that women belonging to the ‘most treated’ group have on average 1.2-
1.7 additional years of education relative to control group, significant at 5 percent
level (except for column 1). However, there is no statistically significant impact
on the mean education levels of the ‘partially treated’ group, relative to control.
In other words, the inheritance reform significantly impacted overall educational
attainment of those women in the treated group who were of primary school-going
age at the time of reform (10 years or younger),27 but not those who were past
26I use Consumer Price Index for Agricultural Workers as the deflator since the REDS dataset
focuses on a rural sample. This is obtained from the LSE EOPP Indian States Dataset at http:
//sticerd.lse.ac.uk/eopp/_new/data/indian_data/default.asp. Also, over 90 percent of
the families in my sample pay dowry and receive nothing, hence I only focus on dowry payments.
27In India, children normally attend primary school between the ages of 5 and 10, middle school
between ages 11 and 13 and secondary school between ages 14 and 15.
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this age (11-15 years). One possible interpretation for such a finding could be
that following the reform, parents enabled their primary school-aged daughters to
complete their primary education instead of dropping out, so as to compensate
them for their disinheritance with more schooling. However, if the daughter was
11-15 years old at the time of reform, she was already of marriageable age,28 and
in order to protect their reputation, parents face pressure to marry o↵ these girls,
which curtails their education.29 This did not change after the reform, hence we find
no significant impact on mean educational levels for this group of women relative to
control. With state-year of birth fixed e↵ects, the coe cient for this group becomes
positive (Column 4), but still remains insignificant. Finally, although the coe cient
for the ‘least treated’ group is negative, it is only marginally significant with state
linear trends, and insignificant with state-year of birth fixed e↵ects. This is expected
since a lot of these women were most likely to be have been married by the time the
reform was passed and thereby unlikely to inherit a share in joint family property
under the new rules. Thus, the need for compensation for this group is minimal.
Coupled with the dowry results presented earlier, these findings suggest that
parents appear to be compensating their daughters for disinheriting them from their
rightful share in joint family property as stipulated by amendments to the HSA 1956,
by giving them either higher dowries or more education. Dowry has traditionally
constituted the most common form of such compensation, as noted by Goody (1976)
and Botticini and Siow (2003), and this is the form of compensation enjoyed by
women who were past primary school-going age and had entered marriageable at
the time of reform (i.e. the ‘partially treated’ group). For women who were of
primary school-going age at the time of reform (i.e. the ‘most treated’ group), the
compensation took the form of higher education, and consequently lower dowries.30
The observed trade-o↵ between dowries and education may be explained in two
ways: parents choose to compensate daughters only along one dimension, and since
the 10 or younger group gains in terms of education in exchange of inheritance rights,
28In rural India, girls are considered to be of marriageable age once they attain puberty, which
typically happens around 10-11 years of age.
29I thank a referee for this suggestion.
30It is unlikely that this observed dowry e↵ect is driven by general trends in the marriage
market, e.g. a rising mean age at marriage for females [Government of India, 2001]. If such
trends are common for all households in my sample, then they would di↵erenced out by triple
di↵erencing by timing of grandfather’s death. According to Anderson [2007], rising female mean
age at marriage would lead to non-increasing (even decreasing) average dowry payments at marriage
in a dynamic modelling framework, which is what I find for my control groups of households where
the grandfather died before reform, and which is also consistent with the evidence presented in
Arunachalam and Logan [2008]. If, on the other hand, the reform itself led to an increase in mean
age at marriage for women, then one might expect the triple-interaction coe cients for the treated
groups to be biased. However, I find no significant impact of the reform on mean female age at
marriage (see Appendix Table A5), which serves to alleviate this concern.
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they are paid less pre-mortem bequest in the form of dowries. This explanation views
education and dowry payments as competing channels of compensating daughters
for disinheriting them from their rightful share in ancestral property. Alternatively,
if dowry is interpreted as a price that clears marriage markets, then higher education
could substitute for dowry payments as more educated brides enjoy higher valuation
in the marriage market31 and hence have to pay lower dowries to secure the groom
of their choice.
However, the question remains as to why parents switch from dowry to education
as a means of compensating daughters across cohorts. One potential explanation
could be that although dowry is often interpreted as a pre-mortem bequest given
to the daughter at the time of her marriage, it hardly remains under the control
of the daughter after her marriage, and hence does not necessarily improve her
welfare in reality [Suran et al., 2004]. Education, on the contrary, is inalienable as
an investment in the daughter and hence may be preferred by parents as a means
of compensation when available. However, it cannot be ruled out that parents may
also be responding to a scenario of changing returns to female education in a growing
Indian economy.32
4.3 Robustness Check using Alternative Dataset
The REDS 99 dataset that I have used so far is a rural dataset. To test the ro-
bustness of the findings of this paper, I use a nationally representative dataset in
the form of the National Family Health Survey (NFHS), which covers both rural
and urban areas.33 NFHS consists of multiple waves conducted in 1992, 1998 and
2005 as repeated cross-sections, and covers all the states of India.34 NFHS contains
individual level information on household members including daughters, e.g. their
educational attainment, but unfortunately, none on inheritance or dowry payments.
Hence, I am able to test the robustness of the education results alone using the
NFHS.
In case of the NFHS too, I focus on women who are daughters of the head of
31Behrman et al. [1999] finds that educated brides are valued more by the grooms family and
command a premium in the marriage market, arguably due to the advantage of home schooling by
mothers as an input in the production of child education
32Such changes in labour market returns may arise either due to increased opportunities for
labor force participation and higher returns to schooling, or due to lower costs of education owing
to expansion of publicly provided education, or both.
33The NFHS is carried out by the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, Government of India,
and is designed along the lines of the Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) that have been
conducted in many developing countries around the world.
34Here too, I drop Jammu and Kashmir since HSA 1956 does not apply. Also, the results are
robust to restricting the NFHS sample to the 16 major states, as in REDS 99.
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the household, at least 22 years old at the time of survey35 and whose mothers
were unexposed to the reform.36 In addition, I also restrict the sample to women
belonging to “Hindu” households. This leaves me with a sample size of 9,264.
Summary statistics for this sample are presented in Appendix Table A3, while
the pre-reform balance test is conducted in Appendix Table A4. In Appendix Table
A4, Panel A uses all the states and “pre-reform” is defined as being 21 years or older
in 1976, the earliest reform year (Kerala). Panel B uses all states apart from Kerala,
i.e. the reforming group now consists of the late reformers - AP, TN, Maharashtra
and Karnataka - and “pre-reform” is defined as being 21 years or older in 1986, the
earliest reform year in this sub-group (AP). Panel C uses all states apart from the
late reformers, i.e. the reforming group now comprises only of Kerala, and “pre-
reform” is defined as being 21 years or older in 1976, the year Kerala reformed.
“Non-reform” indicates states that never reformed throughout the table. Panels
A and B indicates that there is relatively little systematic di↵erences between the
late reforming states and the non-reforming states prior to the reform. I control
for these covariates in the regressions. However, Panel C indicates that Kerala was
di↵erent from the non-reforming states on certain dimensions even before the reform.
Therefore, I also present results excluding Kerala in Appendix Table A7.
Unlike REDS, NFHS does not contain data on the year of the death of the pater-
nal grandfather of the woman. Hence, I use a coarser definition of treatment status
for the triple-di↵erence strategy: land ownership. Only if the natal household of the
woman owns any joint family property would the reform have any bite. Land is the
most commonly held form of joint family/ancestral property, hence it makes sense
to exploit variation along the dimension of land ownership of the woman’s house-
hold for identification. Now, since a household’s land ownership status is obtained
at the time of survey, the underlying assumption is that this status has remained
unchanged over time. If this assumption does not hold in reality, then measure-
ment error would lead to attenuation bias in the triple di↵erences estimates.37 A
35This could potentially give rise to a concern over sample selection as, unlike REDS, NFHS
interviews the daughter herself who is present in the household. Given that mean age of marriage
for females in India is 18 years and girls typically leave their parents’ household after marriage, this
might lead to a biased sample. However, the main concern in this context is that the reform itself
could have introduced di↵erential selection into the sample along the dimension of education e.g
if educated younger daughters may have been systematically more or less likely to stay behind in
their parents’ household following the reform. However, given that staying back in parents’ house
is synonymous with remaining unmarried in India due to virilocality norms, I test for the potential
endogeneity of female age at marriage to the reform, but find no significant e↵ect (see Appendix
Table A5).
36Since the latest round of NFHS is conducted in 2005, the minimum age that mothers need to
be in order to be unexposed to the reform is 50 years at the time of survey.
37To elaborate on this, two possibilities could arise: one, it could be that the woman’s family did
not own land when she was young but does own land now (at the time of survey) and second, the
family owned land when she was young but does not now. In the first case, reform would not have
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bigger concern, however, is that land ownership status maybe correlated with the
reform. The identifying assumption of the triple-di↵erences strategy here is that
the di↵erence in educational outcomes between women belonging to the “treated”
and “control” groups is on account of the reform. However, if gender progressive
parents had acquired additional land in anticipation of the reform, then this assump-
tion would be violated. But it is important to note here that the reform relates to
ancestral property, and not to separate property acquired by the father in his life-
time, which allays fears of strategic land procurement by parents that could bias the
results.38
Regarding caste status, the NFHS only contains SC/ST status rather than the
finer caste categorization that is obtained in REDS 99. Hence, for the sake of
comparison with NFHS, I also present the results for education with REDS 99 data
using a dummy for SC/ST rather than the full set of caste dummies in Table 6
(columns 5 and 6). The results for education using NFHS data are presented in
Table 7, and are qualitatively similar to those obtained in columns 5 and 6 of Table
6, although smaller in magnitude in some specifications. For example, with the
inclusion of state linear trends (Column 3), the reform is found to have increased
mean educational attainment of women belonging to the ‘most treated’ group by
1.02 years relative to control group, significant at 5% level. The impact on those
belonging to the ‘partially treated’ group, although somewhat large and positive,
is not statistically significant, while that the ‘least treated’ group is negative and
insignificant. All the results are robust to replacing state linear trends with state-
year of birth fixed e↵ects (Column 4).39
Given the well-known problem of rising sex-selective abortion in India over the
years, a concern that may arise while interpreting the above education results with
NFHS is that families that decide to raise a daughter are more gender-progressive
had any impact on the woman’s education and including her as being landed introduces downward
bias in my estimates. Moreover, the fact that the family did not own land earlier implies that the
land was in most probability newly acquired and hence cannot represent ancestral property. In
the second case, the reform would have had an impact on the woman’s education and excluding
her also leads to downward bias.
38One could still think of the case where gender-progressive parents acquire “separate” land and
claim it to be “ancestral” property (fungibility) that would bias the estimates. The NFHS does not
contain any information on land transactions by parents, but the REDS 1999 does. Regressing a
binary variable, which equals 1 if the father has engaged in any land purchase/sale after becoming
head and zero otherwise, on the treatment groups, I find no di↵erential e↵ect in propensity to buy
or sell land between families with “treated” girls and those with control girls, shown in Appendix
Table A6. If the opposite were true, i.e. gender-regressive parents turn “ancestral” land into
“separate” land in anticipation of the reform, then my results would provide a lower bound for the
true e↵ect.
39Testing the robustness of these results to the exclusion of Kerala, I find that the impact on
women belonging to the ‘most treated’ group is no longer significant at conventional levels, but the
magnitude of the coe cients are broadly comparable with those for the full sample (see Appendix
Table A7).
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and thereby more likely to invest in her education. This may introduce sample
selection bias in the education estimates since only those daughters survived who
were more valued by their families and hence given more education. However, this
concern is less salient in the context of the current analysis since most of the daugh-
ters included in my sample were already born by the time the reform was passed
(i.e. the decision to have/abort them was already taken). Hence, an upward bias
in the estimates due to selection bias is unlikely to be driving the education results.
Moreover, the results remain qualitatively unchanged if I use women born on or
before the year of reform (i.e. change the ‘most treated’ group from “aged 10 years
or younger at reform” to “aged 0-10 years at reform”).
5 Conclusion
This paper studies the impact of an improvement in female property inheritance
rights on women’s outcomes, by using state-level amendments to the central inher-
itance law of India. The key treatment is whether a woman’s paternal grandfather
died after the amendment was passed in her state, since death of the grandfather
serves as the main trigger for partition of ancestral property of her natal household.
I use a triple-di↵erences approach to estimate the impact of the reform, whereby
I analyze the outcomes of women in reforming states that were young enough to
be unmarried at the time of reform in households where the grandfather died after
the reform, relative to control groups. I find that even though the reform entitled
daughters to inherit equal shares in joint family property as sons, in reality, this
did not happen. In other words, I find no impact of the reform on likelihood of
inheritance by women. Instead, the likelihood of a “land gift” being made to a
brother of a treated woman increased relative to the control group. I interpret this
as indicating that fathers were circumventing the law by “gifting” their share of the
coparcenary (joint family) property to the son in order to avoid having to give prop-
erty to the daughter, and which was made possible due to the intestate nature of the
HSA 1956. Therefore, the reason why no first order e↵ect of the reform is observed
on land inheritance of daughters is because parents were behaving strategically to
avoid having to comply by the rules of the amendment and give inheritance to their
daughters.
Instead, the findings of my paper indicate that parents appear to be compen-
sating their daughters for such disinheritance, by either giving them higher dowries
or more education after the reform. Dowry has traditionally constituted the most
common form of such compensation, and this is the form of compensation enjoyed
by women who were past primary school-going age but entering marriageable age at
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the time of reform. For women who were of primary school-going age at that time
of reform, the compensation took for form of higher education, and lower dowry.
Finally, women who were old enough to have already been married at the time of
reform received nothing.
The broader question that the findings of this paper raise is whether policy
reforms can successfully bring about change in existing social norms. In the case of
inheritance in India, this does not appear to be the case, at least in the short run,
and a potential explanation may be that the social norm in question is too deeply
entrenched. This would, however, not be the first example of a gender progressive
law biting the dust when it comes to actual implementation - the Dowry Prohibition
Act (1961) made dowries illegal in India, but such payments continue to be made
at the time of marrying daughters even today. However, it is also important to
note that although the inheritance reform did not have its desired first order impact
on women’s inheritance, the increase in investment in their human capital, even
if undertaken for compensatory reasons, is nevertheless encouraging. Hence, the
interesting question that arises in this context is whether, even in the face of sticky
social norms, other factors may emerge to reinforce gender-progressive legislation
and aid the evolution of social norms. Further research on the nature of such factors
(e.g. labour market changes) would help deepen our understanding of the process
of social change in general.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for REDS 99 Dataset 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 All 
states 
Non-Reforming 
states 
Reforming states 
 All <=10 11-15 16-20 >=21 
Age 32.74 32.72 32.78 27.04 28.18 27.40 36.39 
 (8.47) (8.59) (8.23) (3.40) (5.70) (5.56) (7.99) 
Father's education 3.69 3.76 3.57 4.77 4.54 3.83 3.13 
 (3.42) (3.59) (3.09) (3.27) (3.50) (3.21) (2.85) 
Father's age 63.32 63.03 63.83 60.88 61.96 59.99 66.01 
 (9.49) (9.58) (9.32) (8.69) (8.13) (8.54) (9.21) 
Mother's education 1.97 1.78 2.36 4.21 3.03 2.31 1.92 
 (1.95) (1.84) (2.09) (2.87) (2.08) (2.06) (1.66) 
Mother's age 57.36 58.18 55.79 55.22 53.77 52.23 57.62 
 (19.09) (22.87) (7.59) (7.07) (6.98) (6.64) (7.54) 
Inheritance 0.07 0.08 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.03 
 (0.25) (0.27) (0.19) (0.19) (0.22) (0.24) (0.17) 
Land Gift to Son after GF's death 0.11 0.12 0.10 0.02 0.09 0.06 0.13 
 (0.31) (0.32) (0.30) (0.14) (0.29) (0.24) (0.33) 
Log(Dowry Payments) 7.62 7.42 8.13 8.43 8.30 7.84 8.15 
 (1.37) (1.37) (1.21) (1.27) (1.27) (1.31) (1.13) 
Years of education 4.43 3.86 5.49 9.34 7.59 5.72 4.41 
 (4.68) (4.53) (4.76) (4.39) (4.58) (4.80) (4.35) 
Log(income) 3.38 3.46 3.23 3.63 3.48 3.20 3.14 
 (0.93) (0.97) (0.82) (0.70) (0.78) (0.81) (0.82) 
No. of daughters 3.19 3.24 3.09 2.53 2.61 3.12 3.25 
 (1.55) (1.58) (1.49) (1.27) (1.30) (1.54) (1.49) 
No. of sons 2.51 2.63 2.29 2.02 2.08 2.15 2.42 
 (1.49) (1.51) (1.41) (1.55) (1.43) (1.35) (1.39) 
Low caste 0.58 0.47 0.77 0.62 0.73 0.83 0.77 
 (0.49) (0.50) (0.42) (0.49) (0.45) (0.37) (0.42) 
Observations 4207 2735 1472 162 120 313 877 
Notes: Standard deviations are in parentheses. This table uses the REDS 99 dataset. Low caste indicates Scheduled Caste, 
Scheduled Tribe or other backward caste. The   binary   variable   “inheritance”   indicates   whether   the   woman   received   land  
inheritance  after  grandfather’s  (GF)  death. 
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Table 2: Pre-reform Balance Test for REDS 99 Dataset 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Panel A: Year of birth<=1955  Panel B: Age >=21 at reform 
 Non- 
reforming 
state 
Reforming 
state 
Difference 
(2)-(1)  
 Reforming states 
  GF died 
before reform 
GF died  
after reform 
Difference 
(5)-(4) 
Age 50.56 49.64 -0.92  36.45 36.04 -0.41 
 (0.67) (0.67) [0.36]  (0.78) (0.78) [0.84] 
Father's education 2.61 3.20 0.58  3.13 3.11 -0.02 
 (0.28) (0.28) [0.45]  (0.28) (0.28) [0.97] 
Father's age 75.23 76.85 1.62  66.62 62.35 -4.27** 
 (0.87) (0.87) [0.19]  (0.89) (0.89) [0.05] 
Mother's education 1.38 2.20 0.83  1.85 2.53 0.67 
 (0.21) (0.21) [0.25]  (0.23) (0.23) [0.15] 
Mother's age 69.98 67.74 -2.24  57.94 54.54 -3.40*** 
 (1.00) (1.00) [0.13]  (1.02) (1.02) [0.01] 
Log(income) 3.46 3.41 -0.05  3.14 3.14 0.00 
 (0.09) (0.09) [0.83]  (0.08) (0.08) [0.99] 
No. of daughters 3.14 3.45 0.31  3.19 3.58 0.38 
 (0.15) (0.15) [0.18]  (0.14) (0.14) [0.16] 
No. of sons 2.29 2.39 0.10  2.39 2.59 0.20 
 (0.14) (0.14) [0.62]  (0.13) (0.13) [0.41] 
Low caste 0.54 0.58 0.05  0.79 0.66 -0.13 
 (0.05) (0.05) [0.77]  (0.04) (0.04) [0.15] 
Observations 301 166   754 123  
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01; Standard errors are in parentheses while p-values of differences are in brackets, with 
standard errors clustered at state level. This table uses the REDS 99 dataset. To examine pre-reform characteristics, in Panel A, 
the sample of daughters born on or before 1955, i.e. who were 21 years or older in 1976 when the first state (Kerala) reformed, 
are used. Total number of such daughters is 467. In Panel B, the sample is restricted to only reforming states and to daughters 
who were 21 years or older at the time of reform in their respective states. Hence, total number of such daughters 
(754+123=877) is equal to the sample in column 7 of Table 1.1 above. Low caste indicates Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe or 
other backward caste. 
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Table 3: Impact of Inheritance Reform on Likelihood of Inheritance by Landed Hindu Women 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Inheritance 
Aged 10 or less at time of reform -0.19*** -0.19*** -0.07*  
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.03)  
Aged 11-15 at time of reform -0.03 -0.03 -0.02  
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.04)  
Aged 16-20 at time of reform 0.02* 0.02* 0.01  
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  
Aged 10 or less at time of reform*Grandfather died after reform 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) 
Aged 11-15 at time of reform*Grandfather died after reform -0.04 -0.04 -0.02 -0.02 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Aged 16-20 at time of reform*Grandfather died after reform 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.03 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) 
Grandfather died after reform 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.04 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) 
State fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year of birth fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State linear trends  No No Yes No 
State*Year of birth fixed effects No No No Yes 
Household controls  No Yes Yes Yes 
Adj R-sq 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.12 
No. of observations 4206 4054 4054 4054 
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01; Standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at the state level. This table uses 
the REDS 99 dataset. The dependent variable is a dummy that equals 1 if the woman has inherited any land in her parental 
household  and  0  otherwise.  “Aged  10  or  less  at  the  time  of  reform”  equals  1  if  a  woman  was  10  years  or  younger  at  the  time  
of reform in a reforming state and 0 otherwise. Similarly for the rest. Household controls include the number of children in 
the family, household income, total number of land transactions undertaken by the father and caste categories, which include 
Brahmin, non-Brahmin upper caste, Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe, other backward castes and non-classified Hindus. 
The omitted category is Brahmin, the highest in the caste ladder. 
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Table 4: Impact of Inheritance Reform on Likelihood of Land Gifts Received by Brothers of Landed 
Hindu Women 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Land Gift to Son after GF's death 
Aged 10 or less at time of reform -0.12*** -0.07 -0.10*  
 (0.03) (0.05) (0.05)  
Aged 11-15 at time of reform -0.06 -0.06 -0.05  
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.04)  
Aged 16-20 at time of reform -0.05* -0.02 -0.03  
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)  
Aged 10 or less at time of reform*Grandfather died after reform 0.07* 0.07* 0.13** 0.11** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) 
Aged 11-15 at time of reform*Grandfather died after reform 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.05 
 (0.06) (0.07) (0.05) (0.05) 
Aged 16-20 at time of reform*Grandfather died after reform 0.06 0.06 0.07*** 0.05** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) 
Grandfather died after reform -0.10** -0.10** -0.11* -0.09 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) 
State fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year of birth fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State linear trends  No Yes Yes No 
State*Year of birth fixed effects No No No Yes 
Household controls  No No Yes Yes 
Adj R-sq 0.07 0.07 0.28 0.30 
No. of observations 4207 4207 4055 4055 
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01; Standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at the state level. This table uses the 
REDS 99 dataset. The dependent variable is a dummy that equals 1 if the brother of a woman has inherited any land after their 
grandfather’s  death  in  her  parental household  and  0  otherwise.  “Aged  10  or  less  at  the  time  of  reform”  equals  1  if  a  woman  was  
10 years or younger at the time of reform in a reforming state and 0 otherwise. Similarly for the rest. Household controls 
include the number of children in the family, number of household members, household income, total number of land 
transactions undertaken by the father and caste categories, which include Brahmin, non-Brahmin upper caste, Scheduled Caste, 
Scheduled Tribe, other backward castes and non-classified Hindus. The omitted category is Brahmin, the highest in the caste 
ladder. 
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Table 5: Impact of Inheritance Reform on Dowry Payments of Landed Hindu Women 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Log(Dowry Payments) 
Aged 10 or less at time of reform 0.06 -0.29 -0.29  
 (0.18) (0.42) (0.28)  
Aged 11-15 at time of reform -0.30 -0.33 -0.31  
 (0.22) (0.21) (0.22)  
Aged 16-20 at time of reform -0.26 -0.14 -0.10  
 (0.15) (0.17) (0.18)  
Aged 10 or less at time of reform*Grandfather died after reform -0.38*** -0.37*** -0.28*** -0.35*** 
 (0.10) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) 
Aged 11-15 at time of reform*Grandfather died after reform 0.49** 0.49** 0.50** 0.50** 
 (0.19) (0.23) (0.24) (0.23) 
Aged 16-20 at time of reform*Grandfather died after reform -0.19* -0.21* -0.22* -0.04 
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.14) 
Grandfather died after reform 0.17 0.18 0.14 0.13 
 (0.13) (0.12) (0.12) (0.13) 
State fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year of birth fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State linear trends  No Yes Yes No 
State*Year of birth fixed effects No No No Yes 
Household controls  No No Yes Yes 
Adj R-sq 0.27 0.29 0.34 0.33 
No. of observations 2663 2663 2538 2538 
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01; Standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at the state level. This table uses the 
REDS  99  dataset.  The  dependent  variable  is  log  of  real  dowry  payments  (in  1966  rupees)  made  at  the  time  of  a  woman’s  marriage . 
“Aged  10  or  less  at  the  time  of  reform”  equals  1  if  a  woman  was  10  years  or  younger  at  the  time  of  reform  in  a  reforming  state  and  
0 otherwise. Similarly for the rest. Household controls include the number of female children in the family, household income and 
caste categories, which include Brahmin, non-Brahmin upper caste, Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe, other backward castes and 
non-classified Hindus. The omitted category is Brahmin, the highest in the caste ladder. 
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Table 6: Impact of Inheritance Reform on Education of Landed Hindu Women 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Years of education 
Aged 10 or less at time of reform -1.00* -0.18 -0.53  -0.81  
 (0.55) (0.44) (0.90)  (1.00)  
Aged 11-15 at time of reform 0.40 0.41 0.29  -0.04  
 (0.65) (0.53) (0.92)  (0.97)  
Aged 16-20 at time of reform 0.09 0.28 0.02  -0.21  
 (0.45) (0.43) (0.50)  (0.55)  
Aged 10 or less at time of reform*Grandfather  1.19 1.16** 1.20*** 1.41** 1.48*** 1.75*** 
died after reform (0.83) (0.41) (0.39) (0.53) (0.44) (0.53) 
Aged 11-15 at time of reform*Grandfather died  -1.38 -0.57 -0.57 0.46 -0.24 0.81 
died after reform (1.34) (0.85) (1.00) (1.12) (1.02) (1.12) 
Aged 16-20 at time of reform*Grandfather died  -1.70** -1.11* -1.03* -0.77 -0.99* -0.63 
after reform (0.58) (0.52) (0.50) (0.53) (0.51) (0.50) 
Grandfather died after reform -0.49 -0.54 -0.59 -0.55 -0.85* -0.88 
 (0.75) (0.42) (0.40) (0.51) (0.46) (0.53) 
State fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year of birth fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State linear trends  No No Yes No Yes No 
State*Year of birth fixed effects No No No Yes No Yes 
Household controls  No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj R-sq 0.19 0.42 0.42 0.40 0.41 0.40 
No. of observations 2942 2814 2814 2814 2926 2926 
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01; Standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at the state level. This table uses the REDS 
99  dataset.  The  dependent  variable  is  the  number  of  years  of  education  attained  by  a  woman.  “Aged  10  or  less  at  the  time  of  reform”  
equals 1 if a woman was 10 years or younger at the time of reform in a reforming state and 0 otherwise. Similarly for the rest. To 
maintain symmetry with the education results using NFHS dataset presented in Table 7 below, the list of household controls is kept 
as similar   as   possible   in   both   tables,   and   includes   father’s   education,   father’s   age,  mother’s   education,  mother’s   age,   number   of  
children in the family, household income and caste categories, which include Brahmin, non-Brahmin upper caste, Scheduled Caste, 
Scheduled Tribe, other backward castes and non-classified Hindus. The omitted category is Brahmin, the highest in the caste ladder. 
However, NFHS data only contains SC/ST status rather than the finer caste categorization that is obtained in REDS 99. Hence, in 
column (5) and (6) of the above table, we run the same specification as in columns (3)-(4), but using the SC/ST dummy to control 
for caste rather than all caste categories, in order to maintain consistency with NFHS results in Table 7 below. Since the REDS 99 is 
a rural dataset, and the sample in this table has been restricted to landed households, there is no need to control for rural residence or 
land ownership.  
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Table 7: Impact of Inheritance Reform on Education of Hindu Women: Triple Differences by Land 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Years of education 
Aged 10 or less at time of reform 0.12 0.11 -0.30  
 (0.69) (0.87) (0.65)  
Aged 11-15 at time of reform -0.30 -0.48 -0.56  
 (0.77) (0.67) (0.59)  
Aged 16-20 at time of reform -0.11 -0.19 -0.41  
 (0.45) (0.43) (0.25)  
Aged 10 or less at time of reform*Owns land 2.25* 2.26** 1.02** 0.98** 
 (1.15) (1.14) (0.38) (0.38) 
Aged 11-15 at time of reform*Owns land 0.59 0.71 0.57 0.54 
 (0.94) (0.89) (0.56) (0.53) 
Aged 16-20 at time of reform*Owns land 0.17 0.18 -0.05 -0.14 
 (0.57) (0.57) (0.31) (0.35) 
Owns land -2.22*** -2.18*** -0.16 -0.09 
 (0.53) (0.53) (0.18) (0.19) 
State fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year of birth fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State linear trends  No Yes Yes No 
State*Year of birth fixed effects No No No Yes 
Household controls  No No Yes Yes 
Adj. R-sq 0.22 0.22 0.62 0.62 
No. of observations 9237 9237 7789 7789 
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01; Standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at the state level. This table uses 
the  NFHS  dataset.   “Aged  5  or   less  at   the   time  of   reform”   equals  1   if   the  woman  was  5  years  or   younger  at   the   time  of  
reform in a reforming state and 0 otherwise. Similarly for the rest. To maintain symmetry with the REDS 99 education 
results presented in Table 6 above, the list of household controls is kept similar to the extent possible in both tables, and 
includes father’s  education,  father’s  age,  mother’s  age,  a  dummy to indicate whether the parental household of the woman 
owns land, a dummy to indicate whether the parental household resides in an urban area, number of children in family, a 
dummy for Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribe status. NFHS does not contain data on household income, so I control for 
asset ownership (TV, radio, clock and motorcycle) instead. A control for different NFHS rounds is added. 
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Appendix Table A1: Impact of Inheritance Reform on Outcomes of Landed Hindu Women, Excluding 
Kerala 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Inheritance Land Gift  Dowry Education 
Aged 10 or less at time of reform -0.02 -0.11** 0.40 0.86 
 (0.02) (0.04) (0.25) (1.11) 
Aged 11-15 at time of reform 0.01 -0.09** -0.28 0.51 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.28) (1.12) 
Aged 16-20 at time of reform 0.01 -0.03 -0.20 -0.04 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.18) (0.54) 
Aged 10 or less at time of reform*Grandfather died after reform -0.02 0.10*** -0.73*** 1.65*** 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.08) (0.41) 
Aged 11-15 at time of reform*Grandfather died after reform -0.03 0.06 0.48 0.59 
 (0.02) (0.07) (0.38) (0.39) 
Aged 16-20 at time of reform*Grandfather died after reform 0.00 0.06*** -0.23 -0.82* 
 (0.03) (0.01) (0.16) (0.45) 
Grandfather died after reform 0.01 -0.07* 0.03 -0.77** 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.07) (0.33) 
State fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year of birth fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State linear trends  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Household controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj R-sq 0.08 0.28 0.33 0.38 
No. of observations 3770 3771 2379 2675 
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01; Standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at the state level. This table uses the REDS 
99  dataset.  “Aged  10  or  less  at  the  time  of  reform”  equals  1  if  a  woman  was  10  years  or  younger  at  the  time  of  reform  in  a  re forming 
state and 0 otherwise. Similarly for the rest. Household controls are as described in Tables 3-6 above. 
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Appendix Table A2: Robustness Check of Inheritance Results using Different Waves of REDS 
Dataset and Different Treatment Definitions         
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Inheritance 
 REDS 1999  REDS 2006 
Treatment status defined by: GF’s  
death 
F’s  
death 
 GF’s  
death 
GF’s  
death 
F’s  
death 
F’s  
death 
Aged 10 or less at time of reform -0.07* -0.05  -0.07* -0.06 -0.10 -0.01 
 (0.03) (0.05)  (0.04) (0.04) (0.07) (0.09) 
Aged 11-15 at time of reform -0.02 0.11  -0.02 -0.00 -0.06 -0.01 
 (0.04) (0.08)  (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) 
Aged 16-20 at time of reform 0.01 0.02  0.03 0.03 0.04 0.05 
 (0.01) (0.01)  (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) 
Aged 10 or less at time of reform*Treatment 0.00 0.21***  -0.10 -0.11* 0.12 -0.12 
 (0.03) (0.05)  (0.06) (0.06) (0.10) (0.08) 
Aged 11-15 at time of reform*Treatment -0.02 -0.08  -0.01 -0.04 0.16** 0.04 
 (0.04) (0.08)  (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.04) 
Aged 16-20 at time of reform* Treatment 0.04 0.02  -0.03 -0.05 -0.01 -0.04 
 (0.05) (0.03)  (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) 
Treatment 0.03 -0.03  0.11** 0.14*** 0.07 0.07 
 (0.04) (0.03)  (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) 
State fixed effects  Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year of birth fixed effects  Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State linear trends  Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Household controls  Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Grandfather’s  year  of  death  fixed  effects No No  No Yes No No 
Father’s  year  of  death  fixed  effects No No  No No No Yes  
Adj R-sq 0.09 0.12  0.04 0.04 0.07 0.09 
No. of observations 4054 7559  2228 2128 5054 4313 
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01; Standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at the state level. This dataset uses the 
REDS  99  and  REDS  06  datasets.  “GF”  denotes  grandfather  while  “F”  denotes  father  of  the  woman.  Death  of  the  former  is  used  to  
define treatment status in my paper  while  death  of  the  latter  is  used  in  Goyal  et  al,  (2013).  “Aged  10  or  less  at  the  time  of  reform”  
equals 1 if a woman was 10 years or younger at the time of reform in a reforming state and 0 otherwise. Similarly for the rest. 
Household controls include number of children in family, household income and caste categories, which include Brahmin, non-
Brahmin upper caste, Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe, other backward castes and non-classified Hindus. The omitted category 
is Brahmin, the highest in the caste ladder. 
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Appendix Table A3: Descriptive Statistics for NFHS Dataset 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 All 
states 
Non-Reforming 
states 
Reforming states 
 All <=10 11-15 16-20 >=21 
Age 28.22 27.92 28.96 25.68 26.74 27.75 33.37 
 (6.02) (5.91) (6.22) (3.74) (4.07) (4.44) (7.09) 
Years of education 7.83 7.70 8.15 10.27 9.18 7.96 6.13 
 (5.98) (6.11) (5.64) (4.80) (5.39) (5.74) (5.57) 
Father's age 63.49 63.22 64.14 62.45 62.82 63.20 66.72 
 (7.91) (7.85) (8.03) (7.31) (7.35) (6.99) (8.86) 
Mother's age 56.91 57.04 56.60 55.23 55.52 55.74 58.96 
 (5.87) (5.88) (5.81) (5.12) (5.12) (4.99) (6.51) 
Father's education 5.84 5.88 5.74 6.05 6.02 6.19 5.07 
 (5.29) (5.45) (4.87) (4.76) (4.90) (5.01) (4.76) 
Mother's education 3.29 3.10 3.78 4.83 4.45 3.70 2.55 
 (4.54) (4.58) (4.39) (4.61) (4.63) (4.35) (3.73) 
Owns land 0.50 0.55 0.40 0.32 0.36 0.37 0.49 
 (0.50) (0.50) (0.49) (0.47) (0.48) (0.48) (0.50) 
No. of children 1.66 1.67 1.62 1.63 1.65 1.63 1.58 
 (0.89) (0.90) (0.85) (0.83) (0.88) (0.85) (0.84) 
Urban 0.42 0.40 0.47 0.44 0.53 0.52 0.44 
 (0.49) (0.49) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) 
SC/ST 0.22 0.22 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.22 0.19 
 (0.41) (0.42) (0.40) (0.41) (0.41) (0.42) (0.39) 
Observations 9264 6614 2650 661 502 585 902 
Notes: Standard deviations are in parentheses. This table uses the NFHS dataset. 
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Appendix Table A4: Pre-Reform Balance Test for NFHS Dataset 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) 
 Panel A  Panel B  Panel C 
 Non- 
reform 
Reform Diff  
(2)-(1) 
 Non- 
reform 
Reform Diff  
(5)-(4) 
 Non- 
reform 
Reform Diff  
(8)-(7) 
Age 44.74 43.61 -1.13  36.23 37.12 0.88**  44.74 43.29 -1.45** 
 (0.60) (0.60) [0.14]  (0.37) (0.37) [0.03]  (0.98) (0.98) [0.01] 
Years of education 4.29 4.87 0.58  5.33 5.31 -0.02  4.29 5.49 1.20** 
 (0.58) (0.58) [0.41]  (0.33) (0.33) [0.98]  (0.96) (0.96) [0.02] 
Father's age 71.66 71.67 0.01  67.52 68.79 1.27**  71.66 72.40 0.74 
 (1.06) (1.06) [0.99]  (0.51) (0.51) [0.02]  (1.79) (1.79) [0.36] 
Mother's age 65.69 63.75 -1.94  60.78 60.47 -0.31  65.69 66.20 0.51 
 (1.01) (1.01) [0.14]  (0.44) (0.44) [0.39]  (1.85) (1.85) [0.63] 
Father's education 4.52 4.54 0.02  4.68 4.83 0.16  4.52 3.86 0.67* 
 (0.54) (0.54) [0.97]  (0.29) (0.29) [0.76]  (0.90) (0.90) [0.07] 
Mother's education 1.62 2.01 0.40  1.93 1.99 0.06  1.62 2.50 0.88** 
 (0.42) (0.42) [0.41]  (0.22) (0.22) [0.89]  (0.77) (0.77) [0.04] 
Owns land 0.63 0.47 -0.16***  0.61 0.48 -0.12*  0.63 0.40 -0.23*** 
 (0.05) (0.05) [0.01]  (0.03) (0.03) [0.07]  (0.09) (0.09) [0.00] 
No. of siblings 1.50 1.61 0.12  1.54 1.50 -0.05  1.50 1.77 0.27*** 
 (0.10) (0.10) [0.32]  (0.05) (0.05) [0.55]  (0.16) (0.16) [0.00] 
Urban 0.32 0.35 0.03  0.34 0.41 0.08  0.32 0.20 -0.12*** 
 (0.05) (0.05) [0.67]  (0.03) (0.03) [0.20]  (0.08) (0.08) [0.00] 
SC/ST 0.22 0.13 -0.09**  0.19 0.16 -0.03  0.22 0.12 -0.10** 
 (0.04) (0.04) [0.04]  (0.02) (0.02) [0.37]  (0.07) (0.07) [0.01] 
Observations 239 127   1170 429   239 35  
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01; Standard errors are in parentheses while p-values of differences are in brackets, with standard 
errors clustered at state level. This  table  uses  the  NFHS  dataset.  To  examine  “pre-reform”  characteristics,  unexposed  daughters  – i.e. those at 
least 21 years of age at the time of reform – are  used.  Panel  A  uses  all  the  states  and  “pre-reform”  is  defined  as  being  21  years  or  older  in  
1976, the earliest reform year (Kerala). Panel B uses all states apart from Kerala, i.e. the reforming group now consists of the late reformers 
– AP, TN, Maharashtra and Karnataka – and  “pre-reform”  is  defined  as  being  21  years  or  older  in  1986,  the  earliest reform year in this sub-
group (AP). Panel C uses all states apart from the late reformers, i.e. the reforming group now comprises only of Kerala, and “pre-reform”  is  
defined as being 21 years or older in 1976, the year Kerala reformed. In all the panels, “non-reform” indicates states that never reformed.  
37
Appendix Table A5: Impact of Inheritance Reform on Age at Marriage of Hindu Women 
 (1) (2) 
 Age at marriage 
Aged 10 or less at time of reform -0.25 -0.03 
 (0.44) (0.63) 
Aged 11-15 at time of reform -0.09 0.02 
 (0.32) (0.38) 
Aged 16-20 at time of reform 0.25 0.31 
 (0.17) (0.22) 
State fixed effects  Yes Yes 
Cohort fixed effects  Yes Yes 
State linear cohort trends  No Yes 
Adj. R-sq 0.19 0.20 
No. of observations 7466 7466 
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01; Standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at the state 
level. This table uses the NFHS dataset. 
38
Appendix Table A6: Checking for Potential Endogeneity of Land Ownership 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Father's land transactions 
Aged 10 or less at time of reform 0.06 -0.06  
 (0.08) (0.08)  
Aged 11-15 at time of reform -0.12 -0.19  
 (0.09) (0.12)  
Aged 16-20 at time of reform 0.00 -0.05  
 (0.03) (0.08)  
Aged 10 or less at time of reform*Owns land  0.08 0.10 
  (0.07) (0.07) 
Aged 11-15 at time of reform*Owns land  0.08 -0.05 
  (0.11) (0.05) 
Aged 16-20 at time of reform*Owns land  0.06 0.04 
  (0.08) (0.04) 
State fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes 
Cohort fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes 
State linear cohort trends  Yes Yes No 
State*Year of birth fixed effects No No Yes 
Adj R-sq 0.14 0.20 0.19 
No. of observations 4897 4897 4897 
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01; Standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at the state level. 
This table uses the REDS 99 dataset. 
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Appendix Table A7: Impact of Inheritance Reform on Education of Hindu Women: Triple 
Differences by Land, excluding Kerala 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Years of education 
Aged 10 or less at time of reform 0.39 -0.25 -0.98*  
 (0.72) (0.92) (0.50)  
Aged 11-15 at time of reform -0.18 -0.93 -1.19**  
 (0.82) (0.79) (0.46)  
Aged 16-20 at time of reform -0.07 -0.48 -0.70***  
 (0.45) (0.45) (0.12)  
Aged 10 or less at time of reform*Owns land 0.32 0.36 0.77 0.89 
 (0.94) (0.95) (0.75) (0.74) 
Aged 11-15 at time of reform*Owns land -0.16 -0.03 0.40 0.38 
 (0.70) (0.66) (0.64) (0.63) 
Aged 16-20 at time of reform*Owns land 0.02 0.00 0.10 -0.03 
 (0.55) (0.54) (0.31) (0.36) 
Owns land -2.23*** -2.20*** -0.10 -0.03 
 (0.53) (0.53) (0.18) (0.18) 
State fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year of birth fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State linear trends  No Yes Yes No 
State*Year of birth fixed effects No No No Yes 
Household controls  No No Yes Yes 
Adj. R-sq 0.22 0.23 0.62 0.62 
No. of observations 8702 8702 7305 7305 
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01; Standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at the state level. 
This  table  uses  the  NFHS  dataset.  “Aged  5  or  less  at  the  time  of  reform”  equals  1  if  the  woman  was  5  years  
or younger at the time of reform in a reforming state and 0 otherwise. Similarly for the rest. Household 
controls   include   father’s   education,   father’s   age,  mother’s   age,   a   dummy   to   indicate   whether   the   parental  
household of the woman owns land, a dummy to indicate whether the parental household resides in an urban 
area, number of children in family, a dummy for Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribe status and a control for 
the different rounds of NFHS. NFHS does not contain data on household income, so I control for asset 
ownership (TV, radio, clock and motorcycle) instead.  
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Appendix Table A8: Distribution of Sample Women by Age at Reform in Reforming States in REDS 99  
Age at reform Andhra Pradesh Karnataka Kerala Maharashtra Tamil Nadu Total 
-1 0 0 12 0 0 12 
0 0 0 11 0 0 11 
1 0 0 11 0 0 11 
2 0 0 14 0 0 14 
3 0 0 11 0 0 11 
4 0 0 18 0 0 18 
5 0 0 17 0 0 17 
6 0 0 10 0 0 10 
7 0 0 15 0 0 15 
8 0 0 11 0 0 11 
9 6 0 10 0 0 16 
10 6 0 10 0 0 16 
11 6 0 11 0 0 17 
12 9 0 7 0 6 22 
13 4 0 3 0 17 24 
14 4 0 10 0 14 28 
15 1 0 9 0 19 29 
16 5 0 12 0 14 31 
17 4 21 6 9 14 54 
18 2 22 7 17 20 68 
19 3 21 10 24 17 75 
20 2 34 3 24 22 85 
21 5 26 12 20 14 77 
22 3 23 3 16 19 64 
23 1 27 3 28 13 72 
24 1 19 6 15 13 54 
25 1 27 3 27 15 73 
26 5 20 9 16 12 62 
27 5 17 1 22 8 53 
28 0 18 2 7 9 36 
29 1 20 3 16 9 49 
30 1 14 2 19 15 51 
31 1 12 3 16 6 38 
32 3 7 0 13 3 26 
33 0 19 1 12 2 34 
34 2 10 2 13 5 32 
35 0 9 2 9 3 23 
36 2 6 3 6 1 18 
37 0 4 0 5 1 10 
38 0 4 0 8 0 12 
39 0 11 0 2 4 17 
40 0 3 0 4 4 11 
41 1 4 0 1 0 6 
42 0 2 0 6 0 8 
43 0 2 0 3 2 7 
44 0 3 0 3 0 6 
45 0 2 1 3 3 9 
46 0 0 0 3 0 3 
47 1 0 0 3 0 4 
48 0 0 0 4 0 4 
49 0 0 0 0 1 1 
50 0 0 0 2 1 3 
51 0 0 0 1 2 3 
52 0 0 0 2 1 3 
53 0 0 0 1 0 1 
54 0 0 0 1 1 2 
55 0 0 0 3 0 3 
56 0 0 0 1 0 1 
58 0 0 0 1 0 1 
Total 85 407 284 386 310 1472 
Notes: I restrict the REDS 99 sample to women aged 22 or more at survey, so that the youngest cohort of women in my sample are 1977 
born, and the   ‘most   treated’  group   is obtained from Kerala and AP. However, the findings of this paper using REDS 99 are robust to 
restricting the sample to women aged 20 or more at survey, such that the youngest cohort of women are  1979  born,  in  which  case  the  ‘most 
treated’  group  is  obtained  from  Kerala,  AP and Tamil Nadu. Both sets of findings are also robust to the exclusion of Kerala. 
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Appendix Table A9: Distribution of Sample Women by Age at Reform in Reforming States in NFHS  
Age at reform Andhra Pradesh Karnataka Kerala Maharashtra Tamil Nadu Total 
-8 0 0 8 0 0 8 
-7 0 0 10 0 0 10 
-6 0 0 9 0 0 9 
-5 0 0 13 0 0 13 
-4 0 0 10 0 0 10 
-3 0 0 11 0 0 11 
-2 0 0 11 0 0 11 
-1 0 0 20 0 0 20 
0 0 0 27 0 0 27 
1 0 0 15 0 0 15 
2 17 0 30 0 0 47 
3 7 0 20 0 0 27 
4 9 0 10 0 0 19 
5 14 0 26 0 13 53 
6 18 0 31 0 27 76 
7 7 0 33 0 18 58 
8 12 0 25 0 26 63 
9 14 0 28 0 13 55 
10 25 24 23 43 14 129 
11 13 19 20 34 13 99 
12 11 20 19 28 31 109 
13 10 19 18 39 28 114 
14 8 20 19 30 25 102 
15 13 12 18 20 15 78 
16 16 20 10 22 25 93 
17 11 23 8 34 15 91 
18 24 38 10 57 22 151 
19 26 17 13 34 28 118 
20 11 37 5 49 30 132 
21 9 16 5 25 22 77 
22 16 17 6 23 19 81 
23 7 32 5 35 15 94 
24 11 23 1 24 10 69 
25 9 39 3 28 15 94 
26 9 28 5 16 12 70 
27 3 16 3 25 11 58 
28 3 23 3 12 11 52 
29 12 10 1 10 7 40 
30 6 18 1 18 4 47 
31 2 10 1 8 6 27 
32 5 9 0 5 10 29 
33 0 12 1 7 1 21 
34 12 8 0 3 6 29 
35 2 9 0 6 2 19 
36 2 5 0 4 4 15 
37 1 8 0 5 6 20 
38 2 4 0 6 3 15 
39 4 2 0 4 1 11 
40 0 10 0 1 1 12 
41 0 2 0 3 1 6 
42 0 3 0 3 1 7 
43 0 0 0 1 0 1 
45 0 2 0 0 0 2 
46 0 0 0 2 0 2 
47 0 2 0 0 0 2 
48 0 0 0 1 0 1 
49 0 0 0 1 0 1 
Total 381 557 535 666 511 2650 
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Appendix Table A10: Impact of Inheritance Reform on Outcomes of Landed Hindu Women: 
Pooling REDS 1999 and 2006 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Inheritance Education Dowry 
Aged 10 or less at time of reform -0.02 -0.71 -0.28 
 (0.03) (0.73) (0.37) 
Aged 11-15 at time of reform 0.00 -0.07 -0.25 
 (0.03) (0.84) (0.27) 
Aged 16-20 at time of reform 0.02* -0.12 -0.17 
 (0.01) (0.71) (0.19) 
Aged 10 or less at time of reform*Grandfather died after reform -0.00 0.74 -0.31*** 
 (0.03) (0.49) (0.07) 
Aged 11-15 at time of reform*Grandfather died after reform 0.03 -0.20 0.39 
 (0.07) (0.81) (0.27) 
Aged 16-20 at time of reform*Grandfather died after reform 0.04 -0.72 -0.10** 
 (0.04) (0.60) (0.04) 
Grandfather died after reform 0.03 -0.51 0.11 
 (0.03) (0.58) (0.12) 
State fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes 
Cohort fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes 
State linear cohort trends  Yes Yes Yes 
Household controls Yes Yes Yes 
Adj R-sq 0.08 0.41 0.28 
No. of observations 4684 3445 3035 
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01; Standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at the state level. This table pools 
the  REDS  99  and  REDS  2006  datasets  together.  “Aged  10  or  less  at  the  time  of  reform”  equals  1  if  a  woman  was  10  years  or  
younger at the time of reform in a reforming state and 0 otherwise. Similarly for the rest. The definition of dowry is not 
consistent across the two waves: REDS 1999 contains data on dowry payments made at the time of marriage at current 
prices,  while  REDS  2006  contains  data  on  “gifts  made  at  the  time  of  marriage”  in  current  prices. 
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Reforming state 
Kerala 
Year 
1976 
Andhra Pradesh 1986 
Tamil Nadu 1989 
Maharashtra 1994 
Karnataka 1994 
Figure 1: States of India that passed amendments to the HSA 1956 with Year of
Amendment
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Figure 2: Education of Hindu Women in Reforming and Non-Reforming States in
NFHS: 3-year moving averages
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